A STATEMENT FROM CRUXPOOL ON EIP-1559
To our community of miners, and on behalf of the whole Cruxpool team.
After reviewing in details what the proposition EIP-1559 is all about, we wish to express that we stand united with our miners, and that we are against the proposal EIP-1559 in its actual shape.
We understand the imperfections of the Ethereum Network, and the need to make it fairer for everybody. We support any improvements that could be proposed, when it’s fair to the miners – because without miners, there wouldn’t be the Ethereum Network.
Cruxpool doesn’t support the EIP-1559 because we think that it is not a good proposal for the future of Ethereum and their adopters. It is quite a shame for Ethereum mining and miners which support the project since the beginning.
Miners are in their right to expect a fair compensation for their work.
In summary, this EIP goes as follows:
In the Ethereum protocol, the transaction fee mechanism is the component that determines, for every transaction added to the Ethereum blockchain, the price paid by its creator. Since its
inception, Ethereum’s transaction fee mechanism has been a first-price auction: Each transaction
comes equipped with a bid, corresponding to the gas limit times the gas price, which is transferred
from its creator to the miner of the block that includes it.
EIP-1559 proposes a major change to Ethereum’s transaction fee mechanism. Central to the
design is a base fee, which plays the role of a reserve price and is meant to match supply and
demand. Every transaction included in a block must pay that block’s base fee (per unit of gas),
and this payment is burnt rather than transferred to the block’s miner. Blocks are allowed to grow
as large as double a target block size; for example, with a target of 12.5M gas, the maximum block
size would be 25M gas. The base fee is adjusted after every block, with larger-than-target blocks
increasing it and smaller-than-target blocks decreasing it. Users seeking special treatment, such as
immediate inclusion in a period of rapidly increasing demand or a specific position within a block,
can supplement the base fee with a transaction tip that is transferred directly to the miner of the
block that it includes it.
SOURCE : Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559, Tim Roughgarden. 01/12/20 http://timroughgarden.org/papers/eip1559.pdf
With this proposal, block rewards will be decreased, and this could be detrimental to miners’ earnings. We support both Ethereum developers and the community of miners, therefore we’re strongly hoping for an alternative solution which will be more suitable for the whole community.
Also, while we appreciate the initiative by Flexpool to try to make a strong case going against EIP 1559, we question and deeply regret their method of putting every mining pool out there “supporting EIP 1559 by default” without asking their consent, or view on this matter, particularly when we have all these means of communication. This communication move, could lead to a division between miners when we all need to stand united and strong – miners on the Ethereum Network are of utmost importance.
In any case, we welcome anybody who wishes to debate on this EIP-1559 to join our dedicated channel on discord here
Eric, on behalf of the whole Cruxpool Team.
Eric - Marketing & Growth
I’m in charge of Marketing at Cruxpool and of course it includes writing for this blog about cryptocurrencies. I also love the NFL and Fantasy Football